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Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified
Family Court: Balancing Intervention,
Prevention, and Adjudication
GLORIA DANZIGER *

I. Introduction
[O]ut of the juvenile court and experience of its possibilities there has grown
awareness of the futility of dealing with the troubles of a household in detached
fragments after damage has been done. We have been learning better methods
than to have four separate courts in eight separate and unrelated proceedings
trying unsystematically and not infrequently at cross purposes to adjust the
relations and order the conduct of a family which has ceased to function as such
and is bringing or threatening to bring up delinquent instead of upright citizens
contributing to the productive work of the people.
Dean Roscoe Pound 1

On July 1, 1889, Jane Addams, together with the Chicago Woman's
Club2 and the Hull House Community, established in Chicago the first

* Senior Fellow, Center for Families, Children and the Courts, University of Baltimore
School of Law; formerly Staff Director, Standing Committee on Substance Abuse, American
Bar Association.
I. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Juvenile Coun at 100 Years: A Look Back, 6(2) Juv.
JUSTICE (Dec. 1999) (citing Roscoe Pound, Future Challenges Judges, 1(4) THE Juv. COURT
JUDGES J. 21, 23, 28 (1950).
2. The two groups of women reformers worked closely together and used many of the same
arguments. However, although the distinction between the two groups was not always very
sharp, there were differences in approach. The Club women acted as "true materialists," emphasizing their identification as women and mothers, whereas the Hull House women were more
concerned to use their background in social sciences to inform their reaction to the "child problem." In many senses the Hull House women had a clearer idea of what lay behind juvenile
delinquency than did the Club women, and for this reason their emphasis was more on preventing children from ever getting into trouble with the law than on alleviating conditions once
children had become involved in the justice system.
381
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children's court in the world. Their goal was to create a separate and distinct
venue for children in crisis, one that would prevent their subjection to
adult courts, adult prisons, and poorhouses.
The founders strove to develop a safe haven, a space to protect, to rehabilitate, and to heal children, a site of nurturance and guidance, understanding
and compassion. They envisioned the Juvenile Court functioning in the
best interest of children and youth, acting in any circumstance, they said,
exactly as a kind and just parent would act. 3
In many ways, that first children's court-and Jane Addams' visionwas premised on providing a "family" for the delinquents, paupers, immigrants, and other "neglected" or "corrupt" children of Chicago. It was a
"multi-service" settlement house-a place of solidarity and support4with the court offering a place where children and families in crisis would
be nurtured, guided, and supported by a community with the expertise and
willingness to address a family's or child's needs. 5
In short, the first juvenile court was actually based on a therapeutic
mode1. 6 As some authors point out, the Pre-Gault court was "a kind of
unified family court.,,7 These courts generally had jurisdiction over delinquency, dependency, and neglect cases;8 they were based on addressing the
family as a unit from an ecological approach and were designed to "protect
and rehabilitate" youth in generally informal and private proceedings. 9 The
Both the Chicago Woman's Club and the Hull House community were, however, ultimately
concerned with overcoming the inadequacies of the existing system of treating problem children and making sure that the state recognized its duty towards these children. Moreover, both
were anxious to ensure that all children received the proper love and nurture that they regarded
as the right of every child. Their campaign to secure legislation to embody these ideas was
prompted by a recognition that they needed legal sanction for informal practices and a desire
that the state should take responsibility for protecting family life. See Elizabeth J. Clapp, "The
Chicago Juvenile Court Movement in the 1890s," paper presented at the Center for Urban
History, University of Leicester, March 17, 1995.
3. WILLL'\M AYERS, A KL"ID AND JUST PARE.NT: Th-E CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 24
(1997).
4. [d. at 26.
5. [d.
6. Elizabeth F. Emens, et aI., Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: An Ecological,
Developmental Approach, in CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND GOVERNMENT: PREPARING FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 308, 311 (Edward F. Zigler, Sharon Lynn Kagan, & Nancy Hall, eds.
1996).
7. Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering
Enthusiasm with Caution, 40(4) FAM. CT. REV. 435, 437 (2002).
8. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 29 (1998), quoted in Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 448. See also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., supra note I
and accompanying text.
9. See Are Special Courts for Juvenile Offenders a Relic of the Past, or a Blueprint for the
Future? 2, 7 (American Prosecutors Research Institute 1999).
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mission of the juvenile courts was to rehabilitate delinquents and to make
them productive citizens, and the process followed was more along the
lines of information-gathering and problem-solving rather than centered
around due process rights and attorney representation.
The juvenile court eventually diverged sharply from the system's original premise. In particular, the juvenile court system during much of the
twentieth century served as a vehicle for imposing harsh and coercive
sanctions against children and families and enabled what amounted to
criminal trials without benefit of counsel, notice of specific charges, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, or the right not to incriminate oneself. 10
In the 1960s and 1970s, several United States Supreme Court rulings
radically changed the nature of juvenile courts. 11 A conservative reform
movement emphasizing deterrence and punishment began in the late 1970s,
continuing into the early 1980s. 12 Proponents demanded zealous prosecution
of serious and violent juvenile offenders, and, accordingly, many states
made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult courts, while other states stiffened penalties and imposed mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. 13
Throughout the 1990s, state legislators seized on this trend toward
cracking down on juvenile crime. Laws were passed and increasingly
used to transfer children to criminal court on the theory that community
protection would be enhanced by deterring juveniles from committing
serious crimes and by providing greater certainty of incarceration through
10. Sanford J. Fox, The Early History of the Court, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE
JUVENILE COURT 29 (1996).
11. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (a minor denied process rights when the
trial judge fails to hold a hearing prior to transferring him to adult court for trial); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that in hearings that could result in commitment to an institution,
juveniles have the right of notice, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront witnesses); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (the due process clause of the 14th Amendment does not require jury trials in
juvenile court); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (an adjudication in juvenile court, in which
a juvenile is found to have violated a criminal statute, is equivalent to a criminal trial in criminal court); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (preventive detention serves a legitimate state
objective in protecting both the juvenile and society from pretrial crime and is not intended to
punish the juvenile); see also Janet Gilbert, et aI., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a FamilyFocused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153 (2001), for an excellent
overview of the juvenile court as well as a discussion of therapeutic justice as it related to the
juvenile court.
12. Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National
Report 83-86 (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention)
available at http://ncjrs.org!htmVojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html.
13. Jeffrey A. Butts & Adele Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals?: Policy Options for Young
Offenders, CRIME POL'y REP. 4-5 (Urban InstituteI998).
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a criminal trial and sentencing. 14 While laws that allowed transfer of certain
juveniles to criminal court were not new,15 state legislatures have increasingly moved juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or
offense seriousness, without the individualized consideration of a more
discretionary juvenile court. 16
Even this most basic and brief look at the history of the juvenile court
movement in the United States reveals the ebb and flow of guiding principles: beginning with the harsh, punitive approach exemplified by the
Cook County jail (where 1,705 children were incarcerated between 1897
and 1899); progressing to the therapeutic model developed in response by
Jane Addams and her colleagues at Hull House; culminating in the decades
of reform expanding the formality and severity of the juvenile court, but
also reducing the ability of juvenile courts to provide individualized and
appropriate dispositions for young offenders.
This article will examine the demographics of the current juvenile
delinquency caseloads and will argue that, despite trends toward greater
punitive measures-including placement of juveniles in adult courts for
certain offenses, the concept of a therapeutic "family-centered court,"
which inspired Jane Addams and her colleagues, remains the most promising approach to delinquency, articulated most notably by the proponents
of the unified family court concept. The article will consider and address
objections and concerns raised with respect to this approach, looking at
ways in which several states have incorporated juvenile delinquency into
a family-centered unified family court.

II. Caseloads and Demographics:
Straining Resources, Programs, and Families
Courts with juvenile jurisdiction handle some 1.8 million delinquency
cases each year. 17 Nearly seven in ten arrested juveniles are referred to
juvenile court. IS This does not mean that the judge sees all or even most
of these cases, as about half of all cases referred to juvenile court intake
are handled informally.19

14. Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults, I
YOUTH VIOL. & Juv. JUSTICE 128 (2003).
15. Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Coun, NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL. 6 (U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (June 2003).
16. ld. at 7.
17. ld. at 12.
18. ld. at 2.
19. ld. See also Howard N. Snyder, The Juvenile Court and Delinquency Cases, in 6(3) THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 53-63 (1996).
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Most infonnally processed cases are dismissed, or the juvenile voluntarily agrees to specific conditions for a specified time period. In the cases
that are handled fonnally, intake files either a delinquency petition requesting an adjudicatory hearing or a petition requesting a waiver hearing to
transfer the case to criminal court. In 1998, juvenile courts waived one
percent of all fonnally processed delinquency cases. 20
However, beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the present
state legislatures increasingly have moved juvenile offenders into criminal
court based on age and/or offense seriousness, without the case-specific
consideration offered by the discretionary juvenile court judicial waiver
process. At the end of the 1999 legislative session, twenty-nine states have
statutory exclusion provisions. 21 The offenses most often excluded from
juvenile court include murder, capital crimes, and other serious offenses
against persons.
It is particularly illustrative to look at the demographic infonnation
relating to the types of cases handled by courts with juvenile jurisdiction
in the United States. 22
• Delinquency case rates rose between 1989 and 1998 for most
ages. In 1998, juvenile courts handled 60.4 delinquency cases
for every 1,000 juveniles in the U.S. population. The 1998 delinquency case rate was 25% greater than the 1989 rate. For all but
the youngest age groups, age-specific case rates showed similar
increases, although the greatest increase was among seventeen
year olds.
• Most delinquency cases involved older teens. Juveniles age fifteen and older made up 64% of the delinquency caseload in
1998. Juveniles age thirteen and fourteen years were involved in
26% of delinquency cases, while juveniles age twelve and younger
accounted for 10%. In 1998, the number of juvenile court cases
involving seventeen year olds was lower than the number
involving sixteen year olds--due primarily to the fact that, in
thirteen states, seventeen year olds were excluded from the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court and were legally adults,
therefore referred to criminal court.
• The most striking age-related increase in rates was in drug cases.
Drug case rates were highest for seventeen year olds of both
sexes. In 1998, the caseload of juveniles age twelve years and
younger had larger proportions of person and property offenses
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.at5.
22. Id. at 12-24.
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and smaller proportions of drug and public-order offenses, compared with caseloads of older juveniles.
Perhaps the most interesting and noteworthy aspect of the most recent
demographic data was the fmding that those who began offending as young
children were more likely to become violent offenders. Dr. Howard Snyder
studied the juvenile court records of more than 150,000 urban juveniles
who aged out of the juvenile justice system (i.e., turned age eighteen)
between 1980 and 1995.23 The study found that the earlier a youth entered
the juvenile justice system, the more likely he or she was to acquire an
extensive juvenile court record. 24 The younger the juvenile was at first
referral to the court, the more likely he or she was to have at least four separate referrals to juvenile court intake, at least one referral for a serious
offense, and at least one referral for a violent offense by the time he or she
reached age eighteen. 25
Furthermore, the fiscal and social costs of this youth violence are unacceptably high. Caring for an incarcerated juvenile for one year costs
$40,000. 26 Vandalism in schools costs more than $200 million a year, and
vandalism directed at personal property is even higher. 27 Delinquent
behavior also carries other kinds of costs that are difficult to quantifydiminished quality of life for victims, reduced earning potential and life
expectations for delinquent juveniles; and emotional stress on the families
of these children and on their victims.
Changes in the juvenile delinquency caseload in recent years have
strained the courts' resources and programs. Between 1989 and 1998, the
volume of cases handled by juvenile courts has increased across all four
general offense categories. Person offense cases have risen 88%; property
cases have risen 11 %; drug cases have risen 148%; and public order cases
have risen 73%.28
As juvenile crime has increased, the public has become frustrated, and
politicians have expressed serious doubts about the future of the juvenile
23. Howard N. Snyder, Epidemiology of Official Offending, in CHILD DELINQUENTS:
DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds.
2001) [hereinafter CHILD DELINQUENTS]. See also Howard N. Snyder, et a\., Prevalence and
Development of Child Delinquency, CHILD DELINQUENCY BULLETIN (March 2003).
24. Synder et a\., supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. W.S. Davison & R. Redner, The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency: Diversionfrom the
Juvenile Justice System, in FOURTEEN OUNCES OF PREVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS
123-137 (E.L. Cowen, R.P. Lorion, & J. Ramos-McKay eds. 1988).
27. Edward Zigler, Early Intervention to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency, HARVARD MENTAL
HEALTH LEITER 3, 5 (Sept. 1994).
28. See Melissa Sickmund, supra note 15, at 13.
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justice system. 29 Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the
trend in many states toward sending juveniles to the adult court system,30
and the public fmnly supports this approach. 31 At the same time, resources
for juvenile court programs are declining and juvenile court judges in
many states have relatively few program options to handle delinquent
youth. Probation caseloads are overwhelming,32 and the number of delinquency cases involving detention is rising. 33 The juvenile justice court is,
in short, a system on the brink of disaster-if not already over the edge.
It is critical, then, to find remedies to the current state of affairs in the
juvenile justice system. There are those who believe that the current juvenile court system needs to be fixed-that the court's basic role remains,
and should remain, as a forum for resolving disputes, and that public
monies should be allocated to address the problems that bring families and
children into court in the flrst place. 34

III. Coordination
The need to address the behavior of youth with a different set of laws
and remedies than those applied in the adult courts has long been recognized. When the flrst juvenile court was implemented in Chicago in 1902,
29. In 1997, Senator Peter Domenici stated: "In many jurisdictions, [teenagers] commit as
many as 10 to 15 serious crimes before anything is done to them. It is amazing how ancient,
archaic, and broken down the juvenile justice system is." CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S5897. In
the same year, Senator Ron Wyden said for the record, "It is not hard to see why State legislatures around the country are proposing bills to get rid of the juvenile justice system altogether."
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S2341(quoted by Jeffrey A. Butts & Adele V. Harrell, "Delinquents
or Criminals? Policy Options for Young Offenders," supra note 13.
30. All states allow juveniles to be tried as adults in criminal court under certain circumstances. Transfers can typically be done by judicial waiver (the juvenile court judge has the
authority to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and move the case to criminal court); concurrent
jurisdiction (original jurisdiction is shared by both criminal and juvenile courts; the prosecutor
has discretion to file such cases in either court); or statutory exclusion from juvenile court. Until
the 1970s, discretionary judicial waiver was the most common transfer mechanism. Throughout
the 1990s, however, legislatures increasingly enacted statutes that exclude certain cases from
juvenile court. At the end of the 1999 legislative session, 29 states had statutory exclusion provisions. See Sickmund, supra note 15, at 5-10.
31. According to an NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll, two-thirds of Americans think
juveniles under age 13 who commit murder should be tried as adults. Laurie Asseo, Debate
Rages on Juvenile Murders, Assoc. PREss, April 24, 1998. In a 2001 survey, a majority (65%)
thought that juveniles aged 14-17 should be treated the same as adults in the criminal justice
system. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (Ann Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds.
2001) available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/.
32. Sickmund, supra note 15, at 23.
33. [d. at 18.
34. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 436.
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its founders believed that children develop and change based on environmental influences and that the state must assume a degree of parental
responsibility for children raised in an environment that negatively
impacts on their development.... Creation of the Family Divisions provides the juvenile justice system with an opportunity to combine delinquency adjudication with a strong presence in the life of the juvenile's
family.
Families in court have interconnected emotional and financial problems that appear and re-appear in different courts at different times
throughout the lives of that family's members. One report has found that
approximately 40% of families come before the court more than once for
family-related matters and generate a disproportionate share of the court's
caseload. 35 Another study has shown that at least 64% of abuse and neglect cases, 48% of delinquency cases, and 16% of divorcing families who
had children have been to court for another family-related matter during
the prior five years. 36
The impact of repeated court appearances-very often in different courthouses in different locations-includes substantial logistical and coordination difficulties, emotional trauma, and significant expense for both the
courts and the children and families who are already in crisis. Numerous
court appearances are required; judges have to become familiar with the
families' backgrounds; and social service personnel from different courts
duplicate services and inquiries. 37
While the increasing complexity and volume of cases involving families and children that confront the court are undeniable, there is far from
unanimity on questions regarding how the justice system should respond.
Some argue that adjudication of the original dispute bringing a family into
the court is actually "a minor part of the process" in a unified family COurt. 38
Instead, they state, "Many advocates of family courts see the court as a
centralized place where services are coordinated, doled out, and monitored.
Judges are supposed to take service providers to task when they are
ineffective, ensure that duplicate services are not given by different agencies, and watch family members to make sure that they are taking part in
required treatment.,,39
35. H. Ted Rubin & Victor Eugene Flango, Court Coordination of Family Cases 5 (National
Center for State Courts, 1992).
36. Id. at 30.
37. Andrew Schepard, Law and Children: Introduction to Unified Family Courts, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 16,1997, at 3 (col.J).
38. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 442.
39. /d. (referring to an article-Jeffrey A. Kuhn, A Seven-Year Lesson on Unified Family
Courts: What We Have Learned Since the 1990 National Family Court Symposium, 32 FAM.
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In certain respects, this is an accurate description. Effective processing
of family law cases calls for coordination with social service agencies.
Accordingly, courts are often placed in a position of monitoring and enforcing treatment and other services for juveniles that have been recommended
by human services professionals, law enforcement sanctions, and mandates
imposed by federal and state legislation. The role of courts as "service
coordinators" however is expanding. This expansion is not because courts
are assuming responsibilities once held by child welfare or social service
agencies, but, rather, because the need for coordination between courts and
agencies, as well as among courts themselves, increasingly is recognized. 4o
While agencies continue to be responsible for providing needed services
to children and families, courts-in the absence of any other organization-must assume oversight responsibility to ensure that families receive
these services.
In Delaware, for example, the Department of Services to Children,
Youth, and Families places social workers in the court building to coordinate with the family court. When the family of a delinquent is determined
to be involved in another family court case relating to another department,
workers in the two divisions are asked to present or file a unified case plan.41
But the unified family court model does not simply tum the family
court into some sort of "uber-agency." While this model is based on a
nonadversarial approach, it does not dispense with sanctions when it
comes to addressing delinquency matters, nor does it relinquish the role
of the court as an impartial arbiter. The sanctioning power of the courts
can be used to ensure treatment. Juvenile delinquents may be ordered by
the court, for instance, to attend counseling or therapy, pursue drug treatment' perform community service, or attend residential treatment and/or
training programs. 42
The unified family court is premised on a definition of "coordination"
that is far more expansive-and responsive to the needs of families in
court-than simply ensuring that case processing proceeds smoothly and
efficiently. In order to resolve family problems, the unified family court
considers all of the parties related to the family's legal proceedings, as
L.Q. 67, 78-79 (1998), in which Kuhn states that the judicial function in a one-team-to-one-family model includes "calendar coordination and case monitoring." Kuhn also states, however,
that "Judges, as well, are assigned to individual teams to assist with calendar coordination and
case monitoring." In other words, it is the family court team-of which the judge is indisputably
an integral member-that is responsible for calendar coordination and case monitoring.
40. Carol FJango, et aI., How Are Courts Coordinating Family Cases? 5 (National Center for
State Courts 1999).
41. Id.at64
42. Id. at 58.
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well as all of the agencies, institutions, or organizations that need to be
consulted or brought into the case. 43
In addition, the unified family court reviews the delivery of social
services to ensure that agreements between families and agencies are
implemented; if they are not, the court has the authority to enforce such
agreements, monitor them for compliance, and/or order agencies to deliver
services. While some scholars view this role as conforming to the "neutral
arbiter role" of the court,44 this is, in fact, a significant departure from the
position of the court as the objective arbiter of disputes. Instead of simply
adjudicating legal disputes, the court must now oversee services, assessments, evaluations, counseling, outreach, probation, diversion, detention,
and community services. This is not the modus operandi of a neutral and
independent forum. It is a way of conducting business that renders the
court inextricably linked to agencies-and the day-to-day actions of those
agencies. The court is responsible to ensure that services are appropriate
and productive. While the court is independent of the agencies, it acts in
concert with them.
Both of these functions-imposing sanctions to ensure that treatment
and/or other services are both provided and followed-are undertaken by
the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated Treatment Network (DJJITN). This
model of coordination of treatment and services for juvenile offenders lends
itself to adoption by family courts. DJJITN' s goal centers around providing
a culturally competent, comprehensive continuum of care to meet the needs
of juveniles with substance abuse or addiction problems. Its integrated
management information system demonstrates how various agencies and
organizations can work together to share and transfer data, while the court
retains primary responsibility for coordination and oversight. 45
Juvenile justice systems perform a preliminary substance use screen to
identify the degree of alcohol or other drug use. 46 Referrals of juveniles
from each of those points in the juvenile justice system, and social services, are sent to the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated T ASC (Treatment
Accountability for Safer Communities) program, located in the Denver
Juvenile Court, which serves as the central point for referrals. Case managers who are certified alcohol and drug abuse counselors, and co-locate
staff from some participating agencies, conduct the differential assessments,
develop the treatment plans, link juveniles with the Network services and
43. [d. at 4.
44. [d. at 58.
45. [d. at 68-71.

46. For this and other infonnation regarding DJJITN, see the Network's Web site available
at http://www.diiitn.state.co.us.
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conduct ongoing monitoring and follow-up. Services are provided based on
the assessment to meet the specific needs of each juvenile and family. The
Network does not seek to develop new resources, but builds on existing
efforts and infrastructure to build capacity and capability.
The Network has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with more
than 100 systems and agencies who have agreed to use, and/or accept the
results of common screening and assessment instruments. These systems
and agencies have agreed to refer or accept referrals of, and provide services to Network juveniles, share information using Network protocols, and
participate in the Network's integrated MIS system, cross-training, and
outcome evaluation.

IV. Privacy
There is great reliance on information-sharing generally in a unified
family court-between agencies; between courts; between the judge,
attorney, caseworkers, social workers, CASAs, GALS, and other court
staff or volunteers involved in the case. Domestic violence advocates in
particular are concerned, however, that expectations of confidentiality are
seriously threatened by a system in which judges have access to all prior
court records and agency reports47-"[A] unified family court which
decides to permit judges access to all prior court records pertaining to
present litigants must anticipate certain risks and take steps to protect
against them. ,,48
There is an inherent tension between expectations of privacy and the
mandates of the therapeutic perspective that drives unified family courts.
The question often becomes one variation or another of "Where do we
draw the line?"
Juveniles, of course, have a legitimate interest in confidentiality. On the
other hand, there is a strong emphasis on "family ecology"49 in a unified
family court: "Courts must view neighborhoods, religious organizations,
and other associations or institutions within which family members participate as having the potential to influence the family's legal matters." If
a juvenile has, for example, entered into a drug treatment program that
47. See Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson et aI, Unified Family Courts: How Will They Serve
Victims of Domestic Violence? 32 FAM. L. Q. 131, 140-41 (1998); Mark Hardin, Child
Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L.Q. 147, 161; (1998) Garaghty &
M1yniec, supra note 7, at 439.
48. Dunford-Jackson et ai., supra note 23, at 140.
49. MARy ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 308 (1989), quoted in Barbara A. Babb,
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to
Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 So. CAL. L. REV. 469, 508 (1998).
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includes regular attendance at Alcoholic Anonymous meetings, does he/she
have a right to confidentiality regarding treatment records and his/her attendance at the meetings? While federal laws may protect the confidentiality
of treatment records,50 should the court's interest in social institutions that
"function as positive influences on family life,"51 trump the statutory and
customary privacy inherent in drug treatment? Is information-sharing such
an integral component of a court's effectiveness in addressing the problems of juveniles that limitations serve as impediments to real solutions?
At least one prominent juvenile court judge believes that these questions
should be answered with a strong affirmative. Judge James Payne of the
Marion (Indiana) Superior Court's Juvenile Division and Vice-President/
Treasurer of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts (20022003) testified before the United States House Subcommittee of the
Judiciary in 2001:
Again, in this age of infonnation technology, the inability, or in some cases,
unwillingness, to share infonnation is a tremendous impediment. Federal laws
and regulations at this time, in many cases, prohibit the free exchange of infonnation. There is a need to evaluate infonnation sharing restrictions and to overcome
those, not by developing means to overcome them, but in fact by amending,
rescinding them or overriding them. It is not enough to find ways to work around
current federal law restricting inability to share infonnation with schools and
mental health. Laws of confidentiality for schools (FERPA), substance abuse
(42 U.S.c. 290dd-2- 42 C.F.R. 2:1 et. seq.) and mental health rules should be
evaluated and rewritten so the concept of infonnation sharing among system
people is not only pennitted, but required. 52

While this view may be somewhat extreme, there are, in fact, statutory
and court safeguards that protect the confidentiality of juvenile recordsand, increasingly, it is legislatures, not courts, that are expanding the
50. Federal laws and regulations protect information about all persons receiving alcohol and
drug abuse prevention and treatment services (42 U.S.c. § § 290dd-3, ee-3 ; 42 Code of Fed.
Reg., Part 2). These laws and regulations prohibit disclosure of information regarding patients
who have applied for or received any alcohol or drug abuse-related services, including assessment,
diagnosis, counseling, group counseling, treatment, or referral for treatment, from a covered
program. The restrictions on disclosure apply to any information that would identify a patient as
an alcohol or drug abuser, either directly or by implication. They apply to patients who undertake
treatment as a form of alternative processing, patients who are civilly or involuntarily committed,
minor patients, and former patients. They apply even if the person making the inquiry already
has the information, has other ways of getting it, enjoys official status, is authorized by state
law, or comes armed with a subpoena or search warrant.
5!. Babb supra note 49.
52. Testimony of The Honorable James W. Payne, Judge, Marion Superior Court, Juvenile
Division, Indianapolis, Indiana, before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 107th Congo First Session on H.R. 863
(March 8, 2001), see http://www.house.gov/judiciary;and/payne.030801.htm.
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boundaries of pennissible cooperation and disclosure between agencies.
When recent amendments to Illinois law expanded mandated reporting
requirements of juvenile delinquency to local agencies, it noted:
The General Assembly finds that a substantial and disproportionate amount of
serious crime is committed by a relatively small number of juvenile offenders,
otherwise known as serious habitual offenders. By this amendatory Act ... the
General Assembly intends to support the efforts of the juvenile justice system
comprised of law enforcement, state's attorneys, probation departments, juvenile courts, social service providers, and schools in the early identification and
treatment of habitual juvenile offenders. The General Assembly further supports increased interagency efforts to gather comprehensive data and actively
disseminate the data to the agencies in the juvenile justice system to produce
more informed decisions by all entities in that system .... A cooperative and
coordinated multidisciplinary approach will increase the opportunity for success with juvenile offenders and assist in the development of early intervention
strategies. 53

This aspect of the unified family court model-greater interagency collaboration and infonnation-sharing-is part of a larger trend in this country: the attempt to detennine a juvenile's situation-including his/her
past, relationships with caregivers, and school perfonnance, among other
factors-which in tum depends on access to records, files, and documents
that provide significant infonnation about that juvenile's background and
personal history.
At the same time, courts need to establish and maintain a careful balance
between the need for interagency collaboration and the individual's interest
in confidentiality.54 As has been pointed out in the context of domestic
violence, "fundamental principles of due process and expectations of
confidentiality have as certain a place in unified family courts as in any
53. Ill. Juv. Court Act; 405 ILCS 405/1-8.1 (1999). A similar statement also appears in the
recent expansion of California law regarding interagency record sharing with schools:
While the Legislature reaffirms its belief that juvenile criminal records, in general,
should be confidential, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to
provide for a limited exception to that confidentiality in cases involving serious acts
of violence. Further, it is the intent of the Legislature that even in these selected cases
the dissemination of juvenile criminal records be as limited as possible, consistent
with the need to work with a student in an appropriate fashion, and the need to protect potentially vulnerable school staff and other students over whom the school staff
exercises direct supervision and responsibility.
Cal. WeI. & Inst. Code. § 828.1 (1999).
54. For an example of programs and guidelines that establish such a balance, as well as a
firsthand account of the importance of interagency information sharing, see Hon. Gordon A.
Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in Delinquency
Proceedings, 21 N.E. J. on CRIM. & CIv. CON. 393-410 (1995); F1ango et aI., supra note 17, at
68-70 (describing the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated Treatment Network, which is a
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other part of the judicial system.,,55 Many of the considerations raised by
domestic violence advocates in discussions of confidentiality are applicable
in delinquency cases as well. For instance, a judge may have access to a
juvenile's record of treatment for mental illness but no information about
the validity of the provider, the credibility of the underlying claim of mental
illness, or follow-up care. The greater volume of information available
regarding a delinquent in a unified family court places a significant burden
on the court to ensure that this information is complete, accurate, and relevant.
Moreover, the court has an additional responsibility flowing from the
court's greatly expanded access to juvenile records and information about
past behavior-the fundamental right to due process.

V. The Role of the Judge and Due Process
Perhaps the most frequently cited characterization of the unified family
court concept is, "one family-one judge." The rationale behind this precept
is that a judge who is acquainted with the legal problems of each family
member is also acquainted with that family's dynamics, history, and place
in the community. Armed with this knowledge, the judge can make more
informed, consistent, and effective decisions than a judge who hears only
one specific problem affecting that family.
The therapeutic model on which the unified family court is based calls
for an integrated approach to family legal issues. In the case of delinquency,
this means that a judge must consider all of the parties related to that proceeding, as well as all of the institutions or organizations affecting the
behavior of that child, including schools, peer groups, religious organizations, and clubs, to name a few. 56 Moreover, judges oversee services that
are important adjuncts to the court's approach to delinquency: assessment
and evaluation, counseling, availability of volunteers, community outreach,
mental health services, family support services, restitution, probation,
diversion, and detention services. 57
comprehensive information systems plan to improve the sharing and transferring of data among
the various agencies that provide treatment and services for juvenile offenders with substance
abuse problems. The system, located in the juvenile court, crosses agency computer systems and
databases to track the status and progress of juvenile offenders. The program screens, assesses,
and evaluates juvenile offenders in order to match treatment needs with the most appropriate
treatment provider).
55. Assessing the Needfor a Family Coun System in Colorado: Repon to the Legislature,
Dec. 23, 1995, at 5, quoted in Dunford-Jackson et aI., supra note 47, at 140 (discussing the
rights in the context of domestic violence proceedings in a unified family court).
56. Robert W. Page, Family Couns: A Model for an Effective Judicial Approach to the
Resolution of Family Disputes, ABA Summit on Unified Family Courts: Exploring Solutions for
Families, Women and Children in Crisis, 16-17 (ABA 1998).
57. See Sanford N. Katz & Jeffrey A. Kuhn, Recommendations for a Model Family Court
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Geraghty and Mlyniec point out that the consequences of the unified
family court's broad and expansive access to information about a juvenile's
past may move the justice system dangerously close to a breach of due
process. 58 They point out that our legal system "prevent[s] juries from
knowing a person's previous social history to ensure that the jury will not be
swayed by that information.,"59 and though "the law assumes that judges
can separate admissible from inadmissible information, there is little to
guarantee this premise."60
This description of the role of the family court is the flip side of the
emphasis on services. While a central tenet of the unified family court is
indeed the provision of services to families who need them, that is not to
be confused with the role of the judge. It is the judge's responsibility to use
the court's authority and power to enforce agreements between parents,
children, and social service agencies, monitor court-ordered services, and
under certain circumstances to order agencies to deliver services-but the
judge maintains impartiality throughout this process. The judge does not
alone decide which treatment, when necessary, is most appropriate; but
he/she can use the court's sanctioning power to order a juvenile delinquent to attend counseling or therapy, perform community service, or
attend residential treatment or training programs. 61 Furthermore, ajudge's
access to the expertise of social and mental health service providers provides him/her with the ability to construct the most effective resolutions
to a family's problems in the context of available services and assistance.
Geraghty and Mlyniec' s concerns do highlight a struggle between the
traditional concept of the judge as a neutral arbiter of disputes on the one
hand, and the therapeutic perspective that informs the judge's role in a
unified family court. 62 While there are certain cases in which there is a
clear advantage to one judge or one team hearing related cases-for
example, closely related custody, visitation, and child support matters 63there are others where the boundaries of "relatedness" are not as clear,
where judicial overfamiliarity with a family may make it nearly impossible
to avoid bias.
11 (1991); Babb, supra note 49, at 523; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON UNIFIED
FAMILY COURTS, Reports with Recommendation to the House of Delegates, 1994 Annual
Meeting, Section tOc (1994) (listing suggested appropriate services).
58. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 439; F1ango et aI., supra note 40, at 25.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 58. See also Babb, supra note 49, at 522-24 (discussing the provision of services
in a unified family court).
62. Babb, supra note 49, at 509-13.
63. F1ango et aI., supra note 40, at 23.
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Responses have ranged from voluntary recusal by the judge64 to pointing
out that judges are under a general obligation to avoid bias in all cases65
to an insistence that therapeutic considerations are not superior to other,
more traditional, considerations-such as due process-that guide the
court's deliberations. 66 In Freehold, New Jersey, the Family Court Division
separates all information from the court record about prior family cases
until a youth has been adjudicated delinquent, providing that information
only at disposition. 67
The bottom line, however, is that the unified family court and its
emphasis on therapeutic jurisprudence does call for re-shaping the nature
of judicial decision-making: "The goal of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests a need to restructure the law and the legal process by applying
behavioral science knowledge to accomplish therapeutic outcomes without interfering with traditional notions of justice."68 While there are those
who consider this a weakness, it is, in fact, this mandate to integrate a
juvenile's behavior, environment, history-and family-into a serviceoriented, therapeutic remedy that is the unified family court's greatest
strength in addressing delinquency matters. Rather than addressing juvenile delinquency from the perspective of a "scaled-down, second-class
criminal court,,,69 the unified family court approach gives the judge the
authority to fashion an effective solution to that juvenile's problems by
managing and directing agencies in their delivery of services to children
and families.
In short, a basic premise of the unified family court is to provide "a
social services delivery system" for families in crisis. It establishes a critical
link between families and the kinds of programs that keep children out of
trouble. These programs include links to social services as well as the liberal use of nonadversarial methods of family dispute resolution. While
these methods are used in nearly all unified family court cases, juvenile
64. Id. at 25. See also, Brenda K. Uekert, Ann Keith, & Ted Rubin, Integrating Criminal and
Civil Matters in Family Courts: Performance Areas and Recommendations 16 (National Center
for State Courts 2002).
65. Flango et aI., supra note 40, at 23.
66. David Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Patients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Response to Petrila, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 707,714 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1997).
67. Flango et aI., supra note 40, at 25.
68. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Couns, 35 WILLIAM &
MARY LAW REV. 279, 280 (1993) as cited in Barbara Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to
Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND.
LI. 775, 799 (1997).
69. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, 39 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 403 (1993).
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delinquency cases have provided the greatest number of nonadversarial
techniques in diversionary programs. 70 For example, New Jersey, which
has a statewide unified family court system, has established widespread
juvenile conference or neighborhood dispute committees, which serve as
an arms of the court in hearing and deciding matters involving juvenile
offenders." Other programs include youth juries or peer group committees,
which resolve delinquency complaints out of court.
The traditional juvenile court is no longer able to provide the individualized attention envisioned by its founders and can no longer easily intervene
when youths are at the earliest stages of offending, at a time when interventions can be most effective in preventing future criminality. The unified
family court, on the other hand, places a high premium on early intervention.

VI. Early Intervention
The prevention of violent criminal acts and other crimes perpetrated by
youths has become a pressing issue in the national agenda, especially in light
of the staggering economic and social costs of these offenses.71 Recently,
prevention studies and clinical trials have supported the contention that
effective interventions must address the multiple causes of criminal and
violent behavior72 and that delinquency can be prevented by early childhood interventions programs that promote children's competence across
multiple systems, including individual, family, classroom, school, and
community factors.
In other words, by intervening early in a young person's development,
preschool programs and parent educational services that, for example,
improve school readiness help set a pattern that prevents delinquency in
later years. Children who participate receive better early school experiences, and are less likely to drop out and become delinquents. 73 The most
70. Robert Page, Family Courts: An Effective Approach to the Resolution of Family Disputes,
44 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1,33-35 (1993).
71. See The State of America's Children: A Reportfrom the Children's Defense Fund (March
1998).
72. See Edward Zigler, Cara Taussic & Kathryn Black, Early Childhood Intervention: A
Promising Preventative for Juvenile Delinquency, 47 AMER. PSYCHOL. 997-1006 (1992); Dan
Olweus, Bullying Among School Children: Intervention and Prevention in AGGRESSION AND
VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE LIFE SPAN 100-25 (Ray Dev. Peters et aI, eds.1992) (demonstrating
that a large-scale secondary prevention program produced significant reductions in bullying);
Charles M. Borduin et aI, Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term
Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 4, 569-78
(examining the long-term effects of multisystemic therapy on the prevention of criminal behavior
and violent offending among juvenile offenders at high risk for committing additional violent
offenses).
73. Zigler, supra note 27, at 2.
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effective early intervention programs capitalize on the family support
structure: they provide services such as health care, parent support and education, and facilitate connections between the parents and community
resources. 74 Based on an ecological perspective, these programs center
around the family as the most important influence in a child's life, which
in tum is influenced by community institutions such as the workplace,
schools, and services. 75
It is imperative that intervention is made as early as possible in a child's
life if a goal is to prevent recidivism. Each subsequent time a juvenile is
referred to court, the odds that the court can successfully intervene
decline. 76 Recognizing the importance of early intervention, The National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has made a programmatic
recommendation that "priority should be given to providing sanctions and
services for potentially or already serious, violent, and chronic juvenile
offenders as early as possible in the offender's delinquent career.'>77
That recommendation is supported by the conclusions of numerous
researchers and experts. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice
assembled an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Study

74. /d.
75. Zigler describes several such programs. The Seattle Social Development Program, which
began in the early 1980s, provides services that address the ecological risk factors for delinquency.
Preliminary findings suggest that delinquent behavior in the fifth grade is reduced among children
who participate at any time between the first and fourth grades. The Syracuse University Family
Development Research Program provides supplemental child care and works to improve children's
lives by changing their home environment. Most participants were families in which the mother
was a young, single, high-school dropout, with a poor employment history. Service providers
met with the families weekly and provided information on nutrition and child development, as
well as guidance in establishing positive parent-child relationships. At ages ranging from 13 to
16, only 6% of the program's graduates had been involved in the juvenile justice system, as
compared with 22% of controls from similar families. The program's average saving to the
juvenile justice system was approximately $1800 per child. See Zigler, id. at 3-4. See also I.M.
Montgomery et ai, What Works: Promising Interventions in Juvenile Justice (U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994); M.W. Lipsey & D. B.
Wilson, Effective Interventions with Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Synthesis of Research, in
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS: RISK FACfORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 313-345 (R.
Loeber & D.P. Farrington eds. 1998).
76. See P.E. TRACY & K. KEMPF-LEONARD, CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN CRIMINAL
CAREERS (1996); Howard Snyder, Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders: An

Assessment of the Extent of and Trends I Officially-Recognized Serious Criminal Behavior in a
Delinquent Population, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS, supra note 75, at 428-444.
77. Recommendation from a National Symposium sponsored by the Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges, The Janiculum Project: Reviewing the Past and Looking Toward the

Future of the Juvenile Court (1998).
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Group on Very Young Offenders in 1998. In a report released in 2001,78
the Study Group concludes that "of all known interventions to reduce
juvenile delinquency, preventive interventions that focus on child delinquency will probably take the largest "bite" out of crime .... "The earlier
the better" is a key then in establishing interventions to prevent child
delinquency ... "79 An opinion survey of practitioners conducted by the
Study Group found that nearly three-quarters (71 %) thought that effective
methods were available to deal with child delinquents to reduce the risk
of future offending. 8o
While there is considerable evidence supporting the notion of early
intervention as a most effective means of preventing later juvenile crime,
there are equally substantial legal concerns surrounding this approach.
Geraghty and Mlyniec raise two important objections: (1) therapeutic
early intervention is a coercive sanction dressed up as benign considerations 81 and (2) this approach holds the resolution of social problems to be
of paramount importance, while resolution of the dispute that originally
brings a family into court is secondary.82
On the first point-that early intervention is coercion in disguisethere is little evidence that families exposed to this approach actually do
view it as antithetical to their own beliefs and/or imposing coercion on
their actions. In an evaluation of Maryland's high-conflict custody program,
which offers ancillary services as part of the state's unified family court
approach, respondents to a survey overwhelmingly welcomed the support
services and programs available to them. 83 Moreover, there are numerous
court programs based on a therapeutic approach--drug court programs,
juvenile drug courts, community courts, to name a few-that are based on
a therapeutic approach (and, in the case of drug courts, a far more coercive
one) which have been welcomed by participants despite their coercive
nature. 84 While there is undeniably a coercive element in the unified family
78. CHILD DELINQUENTS, supra note 23.
79. Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington, & David Petechuk, Child Delinquency: Early
Intervention and Prevention, CHILD DELINQUENCY BULL. 9 (May 2003).
80. Id.
8l. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 44l. Authors assert that therapeutic remedies are
"inherently suspect because they do not start with the world-view of those who must comply
with them. Instead they take on the perspective of the social science researcher who has structured his research and collected data in the context of his own perceptions and biases."
82. [d. at 442. Geraghty & Mlyniec argue that under a unified family court system, "adjudication of the original dispute seems to be a minor part of the process."
83. Report prepared for the Maryland Legal Services Corporation, Center for Families,
Children and the Courts, Evaluation of the High Conflict Custody Program (2003).
84. See Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 2 NAT'L DRUG CT.
lNST. REV. 1,23-4 (1999).
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court-an element, by the way, that is far from absent in many current
juvenile courts85-there is scant evidence that the recipients of and participants in the services and programs available through the court's intervention
resent these "interventions."
If there is one defining characteristic of juvenile courts in the past 100
years, it is that they have developed in unique styles. The early juvenile
courts were built on a philosophy of helping young offenders rather than
establishing their guilt; in later years, these courts were guided primarily
by due process protections. That, in many ways, has been the undoing of
the juvenile court-the emphasis on dispute resolution with its network of
safeguards, due process protections, and sentencing guidelines-has
deprived judges of the discretion and individualized approaches that
should characterize an arena deciding cases ranging from II-year old
shoplifters to I8-year old murderers. The unified family court, far more
than the majority of current juvenile courts, allows judges the flexibility
to choose different responses to the vast array of offenders coming before
them as "juvenile delinquents."

VII. Conclusion
Frustrated by increasing youth crime rates and violence, the public is
demanding more effective methods of dealing with juvenile delinquency,
and lawmakers often translate those demands into policies that emphasize
punishment and incarceration and increasing the formality of juvenile court
procedures, including transfers to adult court and implementing sentencing
guidelines. 86
The juvenile court was created as a mean to address juvenile crime in
a way that allowed the court more flexibility and initiative than traditional
criminal court. As judicial discretion and creativity is diminished by harsher
policies, the justice system becomes unable to provide the individualized
attention envisioned by its founders, and judges today are stymied when
attempting to intervene in the lives of children who are still only at risk of
85. There are states whose statutory provisions allow the courts to punish and/or hold parents in contempt where it can be demonstrated that the parents, either by actions of omission or
commission, contributed to the child's delinquency problems. See Gilbert et aI., supra note II
at 1152 citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(l0); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 985.231(1)(a)(5), (7), (9); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-28(C); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-174(b) Gilbert provides additional examples of statutory authority enabling juvenile
court judges to use coercive sanctions, including in some cases criminal liability and potential
for incarceration against parents of delinquents.
86. See Richard E. Redding, The Effects ofAdjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults:
Research and Policy Implications, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & Juv. JUSTICE 128-55 (April 2003);
Butts & Harrell, supra note 13, at 14.
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future offending. The unified family court and its underlying notion of
therapeutic jurisprudence present one-and perhaps our best-hope of
allowing the justice system to aggressively and creatively handle young
offenders while preserving the rights of offenders and maintaining public
safety.

